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Economics and Machine Learning​
[Matching markets, Mechanism design, Incentive Theory]
(Note: students under my supervision; * corresponding author.)​
Matching markets​​
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Learning strategies in decentralized matching markets under uncertain preferences. [journal][preprint]
Xiaowu Dai and Michael Jordan.
Journal of Machine Learning Research (JMLR), 2021. [lead article]
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Learning in multi-stage decentralized matching markets. [proceedings][preprint]
Xiaowu Dai and Michael Jordan.
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2021.
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Two-sided competing matching recommendation markets with quota and complementary preferences constraints. [proceedings][preprint][code]
Yuantong Li, Guang Cheng, and Xiaowu Dai*.
International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2024.
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Xiaowu Dai* and Hengzhi He.
Preprint, 2023.
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A data envelopment analysis approach for assessing fairness in resource allocation: Application to kidney exchange programs. [pdf][code]
Ali Kaazempur-Mofrad, and Xiaowu Dai*.
Preprint, 2024.
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Mechanism design
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Conformal online auction design. [pdf][code][older version, code]
Jiale Han and Xiaowu Dai*.
Under R&R at Journal of the American Statistical Association (JASA), 2025.
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Yingqi Gao, Jin Zhou, Hua Zhou, Yong Chen, and Xiaowu Dai*.
Preprint, 2025.
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Incentive Theory
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Xiaowu Dai*, Wenlu Xu, Yuan Qi, and Michael Jordan.
ACM Transactions on Recommender Systems (TORS), 2024.
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Dynamic online recommendation for two-sided market with Bayesian incentive compatibility. [pdf]
Yuantong Li, Guang Cheng, and Xiaowu Dai*.
Preprint, 2024.
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I'm also interested in designing real-world matching systems.
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For example, I designed Hilbert Matching [App Store] for the clothing industry.